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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to focus on habit formation as a key factor that determines macroeconomic adjustments of an interdependent world economy. In doing so, we describe two-country equilibrium dynamics in terms of the evolution of global consumption habits and international habit di¤erentials. When consumers in both countries are rationally habit forming, the two countries' propensities to consume depend on their individual habits. The global habits, de…ned as the sum of individual countries'habits, determine the aggregate preference for "present" goods, and hence decide the world equilibrium interest rate. The habit di¤erentials between the two countries determine the di¤erence in the consumption propensities and hence a¤ect the dynamics of the international asset distribution. The novelty of this paper is to work out international interactions that these two forces produce.
We tackle three important issues: (i) the determinants of the equilibrium external asset holdings, (ii) the di¤erences in the e¤ects of global and local income shocks, and (iii) the welfare implications of habit-driven macroeconomic adjustments. We show that a country's net foreign assets depend on habit di¤erentials and global habits. In particular, in steady state, a country's net external asset holdings rely on weighted income di¤erence in excess of habit di¤erentials and global income in excess of global habits. One important implication is that local income shocks have greater e¤ects than global income shocks on the international income di¤erential and hence on the international asset distribution.
With habit formation, positive income shocks lower the world interest rate, thereby harming the creditor country and bene…tting the debtor country due to the intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect. This is an intertemporal version of the immiserizing growth e¤ect developed by, e.g., Bhagwati (1958) and Brecher and Bhagwati (1982) . We show that this intertemporal immiserizing growth e¤ect is more likely to be caused by global income shocks than by country-speci…c income shocks. This result contrasts to the case of trade theory: in trade theory, positive supply shocks commonly occurring in the individual countries'exporting sectors have smaller e¤ects on the static terms of trade than positive supply shocks occurring locally in one of the two countries. In our dynamic context, when a positive income shock is global, the relative magnitudes of the harmful intertemporal terms-of-trade e¤ect to the direct bene…cial income e¤ect is larger than they would be when the shock is country-speci…c.
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The analytical model employs the two-county framework developed by Gombi and Ikeda (2003) and Ikeda and Gombi (2009) . Those papers were concerned with the e¤ects of …scal policies under preference heterogeneity in habit formation, where the role of global habits in dynamic adjustment were assumed away by setting the initial holdings of net foreign assets to be zero. By assuming homogeneous preferences, the present research focuses on interactions among global habits, habit di¤erentials, and the consumption/saving dynamics, and thereby examining their implications for international asset distribution and the adjustments to global and local income shocks. 1 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present a two-country model and examine equilibrium dynamics of consumption, the interest rate, and net foreign assets. In Section 3, we analyze the e¤ects of local and global income shocks on the economy and each countries' welfare. Section 4 concludes the paper.
The Two-Country Model

The basic framework
Consider a two-country world economy composed of home and foreign countries. Each country is populated with in…nitely lived agents with homogeneous preferences. The representative agents in home and foreign countries are referred to as consumers H and F, respectively. They consume a single type of consumption goods and hold wealth in the form of bonds. Both goods and bonds are assumed to be costlessly traded in international markets. For brevity, the representative agents H and F are assumed to be endowed with constant amounts of output y and y , respectively. Throughout the paper, the foreign country's variables are represented with superscript asterisks.
Consumption forms habits. Letting z
where the habit parameter 2 (0; 1) captures the strength of habit in ‡uence; and ' represents a risk aversion parameter. 2 With this felicity function, consumer preferences display adjacent complementarity, wherein an increase in today's habits increases the marginal utility of today's consumption more than it increases marginal disutility of habits, thereby, ceteris paribus, enlarging today's optimal consumption. To be formal, Ryder and Heal (1973) de…ne adjacent complementarity as the felicity function satisfying u cz (c; c) + +2 u zz (c; c) > 0: To capture the intertemporal complementarity, de…ne as u cz + +2 u zz =u cc . Then, with the felicity function (3), the index can be computed as
which implies that consumer preferences in the two countries commonly display adjacent complementarity. 3 Let b t denote net foreign assets held by consumer H. The ‡ow budget constraint for consumer H is given by
Given the initial values (b 0 ; z 0 ) and the (perfectly predicted) time pro…le of the market interest rate fr t g 1 t=0 ; consumer H chooses C 0 = fc t ; b t ; z t g 1 t=0 so as to maximize (2) subject to: (i) the ‡ow budget constraint (5); (ii) the formation of consumption habits (1); and (iii) the transversality conditions.
Letting t (= 0) be the shadow price of savings and t (5 0) that of habit formation, the optimal conditions are given by
where u c (c; z) = (c t z t ) ' and u z (c t ; z t ) = (c t z t ) ' , together with (1), (5) , and the transversality conditions for b t and z t : Consumer F's behavior can be speci…ed in exactly the same way.
We assume away any role of the governments. The model is closed by introducing the market clearing conditions:
where Y represents the aggregate income. By Walras'law, these are not independent: (10) together with (5) and the corresponding constraint for the foreign consumer imply (9) . In sum, the equilibrium time path of (b t ; b t ; c t ; c t ; z t ; z t ; r t ; t ; t ; t ; t ) is determined by equations (1), (5) through (8), the corresponding equations for F, and the market equilibrium condition (9) or (10). 3 Even if the risk aversion parameter ' di¤ers between the both countries, the relation,
The discussions in this section, therefore, can be extended without substantial changes to the heterogenous risk aversion cases. 4 
Equilibrium dynamics
In this economy consumption dynamics in the two countries interact through international market transactions. It is useful to de…ne global habit Z t as
Since is assumed to be common to the two countries, the dynamics of Z t can be expressed from (1) and the market clearing condition (9) as
If Z t and z t are given, z t are determined from (11) . As in Ikeda and Gombi (2009), dynamics can be drastically simpli…ed in the following manner. De…ne as:
which is constant over time since _ t = t = _ t = t from (7) (and the corresponding equation for F). We then construct aggregate indices for (u; u ) and ( ; ) as:
where (9) and (11) are substituted. As shown in Appendix A, we can reduce the equilibrium dynamics of consumption habits around a steady-state point as follows:
(15) where x denotes a steady-state value of variable x: Dynamic system (15) has two stable roots:
and one unstable root, which is conjugate with !; and is given by (4) . From the assumed property of adjacent complementarity, it can be shown that ! + > 0.
As shown in Appendix B.1, the saddle plane governed by the two stable roots are expressed as
where
By equating (17) to (1), the consumption dynamics are given by
Di¤erentiate this by t and substitute (1), (18), and (19) successively into the result. Then, by taking (9) into account, we obtain the motion of each country's consumption as
Irrespective of the second-order habit dynamics of (17) and (18), therefore, the equilibrium consumption dynamics are of the …rst order. Equations (1) and (20) jointly govern the equilibrium dynamics of (c; z); and equations (1) and (21) do dynamics of (c ; z ).
As is proven by Appendix B.2, the interest rate dynamics are given by
where is de…ned as uccu cc ucc+ u cc (> 0) ; implying that Z t plays a crucial role. Suppose that Z t > Z. Then, due to adjacent complementarity, i.e., > 0, ceteris paribus there prevails excess demand in the present good market. This renders r higher than its steady-state value . The equilibrium interest rate positively (negatively) comoves with the aggregate habit stock, which exhibits monotonic motions with stable root (see (18)). The resulting dynamics of r are given explicitly by
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The transition dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the property of the world felicity function and international heterogeneity in habit formation. As shown by Appendix B.3, by linearizing (5) and substituting (19) and (22) into the result, we can obtain
Two habit stocks z t and Z t a¤ect b t by changing consumption and the interest rate. An increase in the habit stocks raises consumption from (19), which should be …nanced by net foreign assets greater than its steady-state level. This e¤ect is expressed by the terms without b 0 in (24). An increase in the aggregate habit stock raises the interest rate by (22). The resulting rise in interest income alters the time pro…le of net foreign assets. The e¤ect is captured by the terms associated with b 0 in (24).
In sum, the autonomous dynamics of (17) and (18) generate the evolution of two habit stocks z t and Z t . Given the values of the two state variables, consumption rates c t and c t , the interest rate r t , and net foreign asset b t are determined by (19), (22), and (24), respectively. The dynamics can be described more simply by introducing the weighted di¤erence of the two countries'habit stocks:
We refer to e t as weighted habit di¤erentials between countries H and F, or simply habit di¤erentials. The equilibrium net foreign assets (24) can be rewritten as
which implies the following results.
Proposition 1: Country H's net foreign assets b t depend on habit di¤eren-tials e t and global habits Z t in the following manners: (i) b t is larger as e t is larger; and (ii) b t is larger as Z t is smaller (larger) if country H is the net creditor (debtor), b 0 > (<)0.
With a habit di¤erential, the corresponding optimal consumption level is high relatively to the other country's, so that net foreign assets should be large enough to sustain it, as in (i) of Proposition 1. The e¤ect of global habits is due to the interest rate adjustment. With adjacent complementarity, a large Z t implies a large demand for present goods and hence a high interest rate. The resulting interest revenue induces country H to accumulate net foreign assets toward the long-run higher level. Equilibrium b thus negatively relates to global habits Z, and (ii) follows.
By di¤erentiating (25) and (26), and substituting (11), (17), (18), (25), and (26) into the results, the equilibrium dynamic interactions of net foreign assets and habit di¤erentials can be summarized as the autonomous system of net foreign assets and habit di¤erentials:
The phase diagram of (e; b) plane is depicted in Figure 1 , where the _ b = 0 schedule is positively sloping and _ e = 0 schedule is in parallel to the vertical axis.
As seen from (19) and (25), it is also noteworthy that the associated consumption dynamics are generated by
To obtain the welfare level of country H, linearize instantaneous utilities u (c t ; z t ) around a steady state and substitute the result into the lifetime utility function (2) to obtain
After substituting (29) into the above equation, substitute solutions to (17), (18), and (28) into the result. In this way, the lifetime utilities are obtained as 
Steady state
From (1), (5), (7), and (24), the steady-state equilibrium, ( c; c ; z; z ; Z; b; b ; r), is determined by:
where (37) comes from (24) evaluated at t = 0. The steady state equilibrium conditions can be reduced to:
where the CC 0 schedule is obtained by evaluating (26) at t = 0; and DD 0 schedule is obtained by substituting (32) through (35) into (36). Figure 2 illustrates the two schedules, where schedule DD 0 is always steeper than CC 0 . As shown by Figure 2 , the steady-state equilibrium point e; b is given by the intersection point E of the two schedules. Given this, c; c ; z; z ; Z is determined by (32), (33) and (34); and b by (38). (39) and (40), we can examine the determinants of the long-run external asset distribution by solving the two equations for b as
where y represents the weighted di¤erence of y and y :
This implies that country H's net foreign assets are determined as in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2: Country H's steady-state holdings of external assets b are larger as:
1. weighted income di¤erence in excess of relative depth of habits, y e 0 , is larger and;
2. global income in excess of global habits, Y Z 0 is smaller (resp. larger) when b 0 > 0 (resp. b 0 < 0).
To understand the …rst property, suppose that income di¤erentials y exceeds habit di¤erentials e 0 , y e 0 . Then, with adjacent complementarity, ceteris paribus country H saves the excess income and thereby holds positive external assets in the long run. We refer to this e¤ect as the relative surplusincome e¤ect. The second property represents the interest rate e¤ect: a large global income in excess of global habits, Y Z 0 , implies a low interest rate, and when country H is a creditor b 0 > 0, H's interest rate income also decreases thereby suppressing the long-term asset holdings. This e¤ect is called the interest rate e¤ect.
Income shocks
We consider global and local income shocks by …xing constant the magnitude of the resulting increase dY in the aggregate output Y . 4 Let us de…ne the two kinds of income shocks as follows: global income shocks: dy = "dY and dy = (1 ") dY; local income shocks in country H: dy = dY and dy = 0, where " denotes the proposition of the associated shock dy to country H in the total shock dY .
The e¤ects of the global and local income shocks on country H's steadystate holdings of external assets b can be compared easily by using Proposition 2. Note …rst that the interest rate e¤ect, captured by the second term of (41), is the same for the global and local shocks. The relative surplus income e¤ect, i.e., the …rst term of (41), is larger in the case of local income shocks than in the case of global shocks because the local income shock has larger e¤ect on income di¤erence between the two countries than the global shock. The following corollary thus obtains:
Corollary 1: Local income shocks have greater e¤ects than global income shocks on country H's steady-state holdings of external assets b in the sense that:
Local and Global Income Shocks
Let us consider the e¤ects of positive local and global income shocks, dY > 0, in order. Before discussing each shock, note that the e¤ect on the interest rate does not depend on whether the shock is local or global. This is because, by construction, the magnitudes of the resulting increase dY in the aggregate output are the same between the two income shocks. Indeed, di¤erentiating (22) and (33) by Y yields
This implies that an increase in Y lowers r (0). With adjacent complementarity, the positive income shock, local or global, produces excess supply in the time-zero good market, and hence lowers the equilibrium interest rate. After the initial response, the interest rate then monotonically converges toward as seen from (22). 
Local income shocks
We consider …rst the e¤ects of a positive local income shock, dy = dY > 0 and dy = 0. For simplicity, let us assume that b 0 > 0 without further notice. From (32) through (38), we obtain the steady-state e¤ect on each of c; c ; e; b as in the second column of Table 1 . They all are composed of the direct income e¤ects, captured by the terms without b 0 , and the interest rate e¤ects, represented by the terms with b 0 . Without the interest rate e¤ect, as in the small country case (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi, 1999) , the positive income shock in country H increases savings, promotes interim asset accumulation through current account surplus, and thereby increases c, e, and b while decreasing b and c . The direct income e¤ects represent these in ‡uences. The interest rate e¤ects, caused by a fall in the interim market interest rate, represent the countervailing negative income e¤ects on c, e, and b under a positive b 0 , and positive e¤ects on b and c . Net e¤ects of the two have ambiguous signs. Figure 3 illustrates the typical adjustment of the economy in the (e; b) and (e; c) plains. The local income shock shifts downward the CC 0 and DD 0 schedules de…ned by (39) and (40) from
L , respectively, and thereby bringing the steady-state point from E 0 to E L , where the case in which b and e both increase is depicted. The interim dynamics generated by (27) and (28) are illustrated as the arrowed path from E 0 to E L . Note that from a close look at Figure 1 , the b dynamics can be nonmonotonic: Country H can initially run the current account de…cit, and sooner or later it turns to surplus so as to generate a greater b. The associated consumption dynamics are shown in the (e; c) plain, where the case in which c increases from c 0 to c L is depicted. After c jumps from F 0 up to F L01 instantaneously responding to the shock, it gradually rises up to F L along the saddle trajectory (29).
The welfare e¤ects of the local income shock, dU /dY and dU /dY shown in column (1) of Table 1 , are obtained by di¤erentiating (30) and (31) by Y . Two properties are noteworthy: First, the positive local income shock harms country H if and only if 1 < b 0 =( + ). This represents the intertemporal version of immiserizing growth e¤ect that the associated fall in the interest rate, i.e., a deterioration in the intertemporal terms-of-trade for creditor country H, harms it, irrespective of the direct bene…cial e¤ect of the income increase. Second, this interest rate fall in turn de…nitely bene…ts neighbor debtor country F. . de…nitely bene…ts (resp. harms) country F.
Global income shocks
Let us next consider a positive global income shock, dy = "dY and dy = (1 ") dY , where the magnitude dY is the same as in the previous subsection. The steady-state e¤ect on c; c ; e; b is shown in the third column of Table 1 . As in the local shock case, the e¤ects comprise the direct income e¤ects of domestic and foreign income increases, represented by the terms without b 0 , and the interest rate e¤ects, captured by the terms with b 0 . The interest rate e¤ects are the same as in the local shock case. In contrast, the direct income e¤ects are smaller for country H's variables c; e; b; U and larger for country F's ( c ; U ) than those in the local shock case. This is …rstly because the associated increase in y is smaller under the global income shock, secondly because foreign income increase dy causes a negative crowding-out e¤ect on c. As shown in the fourth column in the table, therefore the total e¤ects are smaller for country H's variables c; e; b; U and larger for country F's ( c ; U ). Figure 3 depicts the typical dynamic adjustment to the global income shock. The global income shock shifts the CC 0 schedule downward by the same amount as in the local shock case, i.e., from C 0 C 0 0 to C 1 C 0 1 , whereas the direction of the shift of the DD 0 schedule depends on the relative magnitudes of " and 1 (see (40)). Figure 3 illustrates a typical case in which " is smaller than 1 , so that the DD0 schedule shift upward from
G with the steady-state points e; b moving downward from points E 0 to E G . The interim time path is indicated by arrows. 5 The corresponding consumption dynamics in the (e; c) plain are illustrated as the instantaneous downward jump from F 0 to F G01 , followed by over-time decreases along the saddle path toward F G .
The welfare e¤ects of the global income shock, dU /dY and dU /dY shown in column (2) of Table 1 , can be summarized as follows:
